Office of the Inspector General sanctions nine Army members for their role in illegal surveillance of journalists

On May 2, the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia issued a decision acknowledging the National Army's responsibility for the profiling and illegal surveillance of journalists in the case known as Carpetas Secretas (Secret Files). The ruling confirms the responsibility of nine (*) members of the Army assigned to various military intelligence units under the 1st Military Intelligence Brigade, who committed a serious disciplinary offense by ordering, coordinating, and carrying out unjustified open-source intelligence (OSINT) activities targeting journalists—violating constitutional guarantees and fundamental rights.

The Inspector General's Office launched a five-year investigation following the May 2020 publication of “Las carpetas secretas” by Semana magazine. The investigation revealed evidence implicating personnel from the Military Cyber Intelligence Battalion in illegal monitoring, profiling, and data collection activities targeting 130 individuals, including at least thirty journalists.

Using OSINT tools, monitoring software, and social media monitoring and listening software, the Army collected data on journalists' sources, geolocation information, and aspects of their private and professional lives. The journalists targeted—working for both national and international outlets—were investigating matters of public interest such as the potential resurgence of extrajudicial executions and the possible embezzlement of public funds within the Army and the Police. In some cases, this information was used to link journalists to guerrilla groups, particularly the National Liberation Army (ELN).

The use of OSINT tools by intelligence agencies should be aimed at identifying potential threats, establishing behavioral patterns, issuing preventive alerts, or planning military operations. According to Law 1621 of 2013, such use must be restricted to “the defense of sovereignty, national security, and the constitutional order.” However, in this case, the Inspector General’s Office determined that the State deliberately overstepped its mandate, using these tools to spy on journalists—violating their rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and the confidentiality of journalistic sources in the following cases:

• As part of operation “HABIL,” which targeted alias ‘Pablo Beltrán,’ an intelligence meeting was held in March 2019 with the participation of high-ranking officials, including Colonel Juan Esteban Zapata Cifuentes, commander of the 1st Military Intelligence Brigade. At that meeting, Colonel Julio Tobías López Cuadros, then Chief of Staff of the Brigade, was authorized to request the name and location of Caracol journalist María Alejandra Villamizar—who had interviewed ‘Pablo Beltrán’—from the commander of Strategic Military Intelligence Battalion No. 4. As a result, Company B of the Cyber Intelligence Battalion conducted OSINT activities targeting Villamizar, authorized by the commander of the Military Intelligence Brigade.

• The Inspector General's Office found that the journalist’s interview with ‘Pablo Beltrán’ in no way justified the collection of her personal or professional data. Under verbal orders from Brigadier General Gonzalo Ernesto García Luna—commander of the Military Counterintelligence Support Command—Second Sergeant José Luis Cadena Torres of Company B in the Cyber Intelligence Battalion was instructed to profile New York Times journalist Nicholas Casey, photographer Federico Ríos, journalist Andrea Aldana, and independent media outlet Rutas del Conflicto. The Army collected personal information about all of them using the same unlawful techniques. In the case of Andrea Aldana, Óscar Parra, and Rutas del Conflicto, the data collected shows that the Army unjustifiably linked them to guerrilla groups. This information was found on two USB drives: one seized during a 2019 raid at the Miguel Antonio Caro Military Canton—home to the Cyber Intelligence Battalion in Facatativá, Cundinamarca—and the other submitted as evidence by Sergeant Cadena Torres during the disciplinary process.

The Army’s profiling actions, coupled with the lack of institutional accountability or sanctions from bodies like the Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación), caused serious harm to the individuals targeted. The surveillance, intimidation, and stigmatization to which they were subjected caused the journalists fear, anxiety, and panic attacks. It also caused emotional and mental health problems, and one of the journalists was forced to leave the country as a self-protection measure.

Moreover, the illegal surveillance and communications interception by State institutions had a chilling effect on journalistic work. These actions constituted a violation of the confidentiality of sources and created a climate of fear and self-censorship, leading some journalists to abandon investigations into the armed conflict and public sector corruption. In its 2020 statement on this case, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted that “(...) systematically gathering public data that have been voluntarily provided by the owner of the data on blogs, social media, or any other platform in the public domain also amounts to interference with that individual’s private life. The fact that an individual leaves public evidence of their activities (which is inevitable on the Internet) does not entitle the State to systematically collect that evidence, except in specific circumstances where such interference is justified..”

While this ruling marks a step forward in uncovering the truth and assigning individual accountability, the Inspector General’s Office classified the Army's actions as a “serious” disciplinary offense, not a “very serious” one. This classification means that those responsible were sanctioned with a lesser penalty, consisting of suspension from their duties and a ban on holding public office for a period of between three and six months.

For this reason, and on behalf of several journalists who were victims of profiling, FLIP (Foundation for Press Freedom) will partially appeal the ruling. We believe it fails to recognize the gravity of the offense by overlooking: first, the systemic nature of these violations by State intelligence agencies; second, the impact on the journalists’ fundamental rights; and finally, the need to impose sanctions proportionate to the severity of the acts committed. Recognizing this conduct as a “very serious” offense and applying the appropriate penalty would not only set a clear precedent against illegal surveillance practices targeting the press—it would also help uphold the right to justice, ensure proportionate accountability, and strengthen guarantees of non-repetition in cases of serious human rights violations.

Although the Inspector General’s Office established disciplinary responsibility in this case, there has been no significant progress in the criminal justice system. The Attorney General’s Office’s inaction sends a message of tolerance toward grave violations of press freedom. Illegal surveillance—even when carried out using open sources—can constitute a violation of fundamental rights if its purpose is to intimidate, silence, or hinder journalistic work. We call on the Attorney General’s Office to move forward with criminal proceedings, formally recognize the journalists as victims, and determine whether criminal offenses were committed and who is responsible.

(*) The nine Army members named in the ruling are:

• Brigadier General Gonzalo Ernesto García Luna – Commander of the Military Intelligence Support Command and acting head of the Military Counterintelligence Support Command
• Colonel Juan Esteban Zapata Cifuentes – Commander of the 1st Military Intelligence Brigade (BRIMI1)
• Colonel Benjamín Andrés Ramírez Villalobos – Chief of Staff of BRIMI1
• Colonel Julio Tobías López Cuadros – Operations Officer of BRIMI1
• Colonel Milton Eugenio Rozo Delgado – Commander of Strategic Military Intelligence Battalion No. 4 (BAIME4)
• Colonel Hugo Armando Díaz Hernández – Commander of BAIME4
• Major Mauricio Quintero Arias – Commander of the Information Security Counterintelligence Battalion (BACSI)
• Major Eduardo de la Torre Díaz – Deputy Commander of the Cyber Intelligence Battalion (BACIB)
• Lieutenant Luis Carlos Trujillo Perdomo – Commander of Company B, Cyber Exploitation, Cyber Intelligence Battalion